Humans have a long history of insisting that they are members of a special group with some uniquely privileged characteristic and eventually being proved wrong. This has played out in cognitive science as in disciplines such as history or ethology. In this opinion piece, I spell out a position, here termed 'radical pancognitivism', that constitutes the polar opposite of cognitive exceptionalism, in that it attributes cognition to literally every physical system in the universe. My aim is not to persuade the reader that this view is correct, but rather to air it seriously for the benefit of discussion.
The radical pancognitive claim
Panpsychism (or pan-proto-psychism), as propounded by philosophers, is supposed to be an answer to the question, 'How does consciousness emerge from matter?' To quote Chalmers (2015) , [P] The 'null hypothesis' that I think should be taken seriously is more radical than Chalmers' panpsychism in some respects and less ambitious in others. It has nothing to say about consciousness. It is the claim that every physical system is cognitive in some manner and to some extent, and that what differs between them is the details.
I call this view 'radical pancognitivism': 'pancognitivism', so as to emphasise that it is a claim about cognition rather than consciousness; 'radical', because literally every physical system is subsumed under the pancognitive umbrella, including quarks, rocks, and half-a-badger's-nose-plus-the-planet-Saturn (McGregor, 2017a) .
For instance, according to radical pancognitivism, the debate about exactly where to draw the conceptual boundary around an agent has a simple solution: every possible boundary corresponds to a different, real, agent (presumably with marginally different boundaries defining only slightly different agents).
The normal human response to this claim, I think, is one of blank incredulity. It is just obvious that rocks don't have minds, and that the universe is not inhabited by an infinitude of marginally different agents. But the ramifications of some of our most successful physical theories, general relativity and quantum dynamics, provoke the same incredulity. While not everyone will agree, I firmly believe that it is not scientifically valid to dismiss a theory simply because it violates our prescientific intuitions.
A motivation for radical pancognitivism
My approach to cognition emphasises the role of (approximate, bounded) rationality in the notion of acting for a reason. This suggests that formalising cognition is a matter of formalising a correspondence between the physical behaviour of systems and the prescriptions of some mathematical idealisation of rationality (McGregor, 2016 (McGregor, , 2017a ; the informal version of this idea dates back to Dennett (1987) . As far as I can see, the mathematics of this task simply do not support cognitive exceptionalism.
A correspondence between physical behaviour and idealised mathematical rationality surely qualifies at least as 'as-if' agency; like Dennett, I think 'as-if' cognition is the only type there is.
The notion of linking physical behaviour to mathematically formalised rationality was also inspired by an important mathematical framework for cognitive science, the free-energy principle (FEP) (Friston, 2010 (Friston, , 2013 Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 2010) . FEP supports a limited version of exceptionalism, since it concerns systems that keep the entropy of their internal states low, but it does not distinguish between living organisms and other far-from-equilibrium dissipative structures (see, for example, Kirchhoff & Froese (2017) who see this as implying an 'overly generous life-mind view'). Nathaniel Virgo and I have previously argued that such systems include not only hurricanes but also machines built and maintained by humans (McGregor & Virgo, 2009 ).
This could be seen as an argument for drawing the cognitive line at 'self-maintaining' systems, while interpreting this liberally to include systems such as cellular automaton gliders (Beer, 2004) , hurricanes and photocopiers (McGregor & Virgo, 2009) , buildings (Dollens, 2015) , or the law (Teubner, 1993) . However, I think farfrom-equilibrium survival functions better as a definition of liveliness (Schro¨dinger, 1944) than of cognition. For reasons outlined in McGregor (2016 McGregor ( , 2017a , I see 'self-maintenance' as merely a special case of rational behaviour: it is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for cognition.
Science and intuition
The point of empirical science is to discover what the world is really like by investigating it critically. When the world turns out to behave in a counter-intuitive manner, it is our intuitions that must give way.
I think it is safe to say that we do not yet have a theory of cognition that even comes close to the power and elegance of foundational theories in the physical sciences. Indeed, we cannot agree among ourselves what cognition is, although any two theorists can usually agree on some of its properties. This suggests to me that we are in need of a breakthrough that violates common sense, like those we have seen in general relativity and quantum mechanics.
It would hence be unscientific to dismiss pancognitivism merely on the basis that its conclusions are unpalatable to our intuitions. This is an important point in its own right, and it does not much depend on examining the intuitions; pancognitivism should stand or fall on the basis of scientific discoveries. However, the particular intuition that tells us rocks do not have minds turns out to be worth questioning in its own right: it fits into a dubious intellectual history of exceptionalism.
Human exceptionalism
Humans, I would say, have bad form when it comes to recognising their commonality with others. History abounds with assertions by particular groups that their gender, culture or other narrowly defined group status possesses special and unique qualities that justify privileging the in-group over out-groups in various ways.
It took a while for astronomers to be convinced that our planet was not literally the centre of the universe. When we turn our attention to other living beings, it is a similar story. 'Time after time we have demonstrated capacities in animals that were thought to set our species apart ' (de Waal, 2017) .
We are, in our own estimation, the exceptional children of the universe. We have been happy to claim that other animals are dumb brutes who can't learn the vocabulary of a language, or use tools, or acquire behaviour by imitation, or infer the beliefs of their peers, or solve puzzles, and so on. These assertions have been contradicted by abundant evidence.
Science, it seems, is constantly expanding the cognitive umbrella: where 'higher' faculties are concerned, to non-human primates, and then to species as diverse as crows, elephants, dogs and octopuses. We now countenance cognition of simpler sorts in plants (Trewavas, 2015) , immune systems (Hershberg & Efroni, 2001) , insect colonies (Blight, Albet Daz-Mariblanca, Cerda´, & Boulay, 2015) and bacteria (Lyon, 2015) . Some sociologists are happy to consider technological artefacts to be agents (Latour, 2005) ; the FEP taken at its face value implies that dissipative structures such as hurricanes are cognitive agents. Radical pancognitivism is simply this trend taken to its extreme logical endpoint.
Does radical pancognitivism trivialise the notion of cognition?
In order for 'cognitive' to mean anything, surely there must be some things that aren't cognitive? If so, radical pancognitivism must be false. I do not believe so: in my view, cognitive and non-cognitive are adjectives better applied to explanatory narratives (Dennett's intentional and non-intentional stances) than to physical systems (see McGregor (2017b) for further discussion of explanatory narratives). Moreover, the important question according to radical pancognitivism is not whether some particular system is cognitive or not (since it trivially is), but in what regards it is cognitive. It does not, after all, trivialise the notion of rest mass to suppose that every physical object possesses one: the relevant question is not 'does this object possess a rest mass' but 'how much rest mass (perhaps zero) does this object possess?'. For certain modelled systems, such as a completely empty universe, I imagine that the system could be concluded to display strictly 'null cognition', like the empty set [, which is still a set.
Conclusion
I have described a radical position which entirely refuses to draw any distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive systems, briefly sketched my reasons for supporting it, and presented an argument that likened queasiness about panpsychism to various forms of chauvinism.
I am convinced that there are currently no good scientific grounds for rejecting radical pancognitivism, and some grounds at least for considering it; I hope that this assertion will provoke useful discussion.
